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The paper attempts to estimate the primary surplus requirement for debt sustainability in 
Turkey, taking into consideration not only the operational deficit and seigniorage factors but 
also the exchange rate factor. In estimations, a modified version of the approach suggested by 
the World Bank (2000:16-18; 121-124) is used (see Appendix A for the derivation of the 
original formula, which is slightly different from the one in the document mentioned). The 
analysis is carried out in two steps. First the real interest rate is estimated and then the results 
are plugged into the primary surplus equation. The exchange rate factor is taken up during the 
estimation of the real interest rate in TL, on FX-related debt. The debt sustainability issue is 
evaluated by comparing the estimated primary surplus-to-GNP ratios required for debt 
sustainability, with the targeted primary surplus ratio, taking into consideration the real 
interest rate and composition of the existing debt stock.  
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Debt Sustainability and the Exchange Rate: The Case of Turkey 
 
Introduction 
External debt sustainability, as stated in the World Bank and IMF (2001: 4) document, can be 
attained by “...bringing down the net present value of external debt down to about 150 percent 
of a country’s exports”, here the aim being “[elimination of] this critical barrier to longer term 
debt sustainability.”
1. Similarly, in general, the ratio of the net present value of external debt 
to GDP of 50%, is regarded as sustainable over the long run. 
 
However, when fiscal sustainability is discussed, the aggregate public sector debt, both 
domestic and external, should be considered.
2  An economy is said to have achieved fiscal 
sustainability “...when the ratio of public debt to GDP is stationary, and consistent with the 
overall demand -both domestic and foreign- for government securities.” (Edwards 2002: 3). In 
other words, national and international creditors’ desire to accumulate government debt 
instruments should grow at the same pace as the government’s borrowing need. A concept 
closely related to the debt sustainability issue is the “primary balance”, which is expected to 
be compatible with a stable debt-to-GNP ratio. Primary balance is obtained by deducting 
government expenditures (excluding interest payments) from government revenues. Also 
highly significant is the concept of operational deficit, which is obtained by adding the real 
interest burden of the government on to the primary balance. 
 
In our earlier study (Keyder 2002), the primary surplus requirements for different growth rate 
(g)-inflation rate (p)-real interest rate (r) scenarios were estimated, where for the real interest 
rate, the average real interest rate on total borrowing plus non-maturing debt (FX plus TL) 
was used. However there, the real interest rate on FX borrowing plus non-maturing debt was 
  2 assumed to be the same when converted into real interest rate in TL terms, since the possible 
appreciation/depreciation of the TL over the year 2003 was ignored. However, as witnessed in 
2002, TL’s real appreciation/depreciation may play a crucial role in debt sustainability. In this 
paper we attempt to modify the formula used by the World Bank (2000:16-8; 121-4) to 
estimate the primary surplus ratio, so as to take account of exchange rate movements. The 
“non-maturing debt plus borrowing” is divided into two parts: the FX-linked part and the TL-
denominated part. The real interest rate for the two categories are estimated separately (rFX 
and rTL); and in the formula used, they are weighted by the FX-linked and the TL-linked debt 
expressed as percentage of GNP (bFX and bTL), respectively. The Undersecretariat of Treasury 
(2003: 93) has used a formula, which takes the exchange rate movements into account; 
however, in the scenarios presented, the exchange rate factor is ignored. Privatization The 
approach used here, however, is slightly different and does not take privatization revenues 
into consideration. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section one, as background information, the 
variables/indicators relevant to debt sustainability are discussed. In section two, the formula 
used to estimate the primary surplus ratio is presented. Section three gives the estimation of 
the real interest rate, first that on FX-related borrowing plus non-maturing debt, and then on 
TL-denominated borrowing plus non-maturing debt. In section four, using Turkish data, the 
primary surplus ratio requirement for the year 2003 to keep the debt ratio stable at its end-
2002 level is estimated under different scenarios. The results are evaluated in Section five. 
Section six gives graphical presentation of FX revaluation rate-real TL interest rate 
combinations that render debt sustainable. In section seven the debt ratio in the medium run is 
estimated. The last section is reserved for conclusion. 
 
  3 1. Background Information on Variables/Indicators Relevant to Debt Sustainability 
1.1 Composition of the Public Debt Stock 
The figures announced for the outstanding central government debt stock (consolidated 
budget based; involving general and annexed budget administrations only
3) for December 
2002, are as follows (Undersecretariat of Treasury (2003)): The total was $148.5 billion, of 
which $91.7 billion was domestic and $56.8 billion was external. Hence, in 2002, external 
debt made up 38% and the domestic debt made up 62% of the total central government debt 
stock.  48% ($27.4 billion) of the $56.8 billion external debt was to international agencies, 
($13.9 billion to the IMF
4, $6.8 billion to foreign government agencies and $6.7 billion to 
international institutions); 52% (29.4 billion) was to foreign markets ($6.2 billion to 
commercial banks and $23.1 billion to the bond market). (The stock figures mentioned are 
gross and they do not include Turkish Central Bank’s (CBRT) debt and Treasury guaranteed 
debt).  
 
Looking at the composition of the $148.5 billion central government total debt stock by 
lenders, we see that 29% is to the market and 29% to the public sector; 20% is owed to the 
foreign markets against money collected via bond issue (16%) or other means (4%); 9% of the 
debt is owed to international institutions and the remaining 13% ($19.9 billion) is owed to the 
IMF (Table 1). 
 
Considering domestic debt stock alone, we see that 52.8% represents the Treasury’s 
indebtedness toward other public institutions (18.8% to CBRT, 16.2% to State Banks, 7.4% to 
SDIF and 10.5% to other public institutions) and 47.2% represents the Treasury’s 
indebtedness toward the market. The Treasury’s debt to other public institutions can be 
restructured or consolidated with interest rates in favor of the debtor, also the interest 
  4 payments among the public institutions are netted out when the public sector balance sheet is 
consolidated. Hence, in discussing the debt sustainability issue, the major concern is actually 
the public sector debt stock toward the market. 











Debt by Lender   148.5  100  185.4  100 
Domestic Market  43.3  29  65.4 35 
Public Sector  42.5  29  54.1 29 
Foreign Market  29.4  20  31.0 17 
Bond Issue  23.1  16  25.1 14 
Other  6.3  4  5.9 3 
International Institutions  13.5  9  13.4 7 
IMF Credit  19.9  13  21.5 12 
Source:Treasury.        
 
In 2002, 32% of the domestic debt stock is FX-related. This corresponds to 20% of the total 
stock. Hence 38%+20%=58% of the total stock is FX-related. The other components of the 
domestic debt stock by instruments are; 25% fixed, 43% Floating Rate Notes (FRNs).  
 
As of the end of July 2003, the composition of the consolidated budget debt stock has not 
changed much. The total public debt stock has increased to $185.4 billion, 32% of which is 
external, and 68% domestic. 50.3% of the public debt is TL denominated and 49.7% FX 
linked. 35% of the total debt stock is to the Domestic Market, 29% to the Public Sector, 17% 
to Foreign Markets, 7% to International Institutions and 12% to the IMF (Table 1). Looking at 
the domestic debt stock alone, of the  $126 billion, 48.1% of the debt is to the public sector 





  5 1.2 Debt-to-GNP Ratio 
The debt-to-GNP ratio, which was 29% in 1990 and 57% in 2000, climbed up to 92% in 
2001, and was back to 79.4% in 2002. The reasons behind the debt explosion experienced in 
2001 can be summarized as follows:  
-  Weak fiscal performance: Over the period between 1990-94, the primary deficit-to-
GNP ratio averaged 4.5%, while the operational deficit was on average 8.3% of GNP. 
-  High real interest rates: The primary deficit of the first half of the 1990s turned into a 
primary surplus (0.1% of GNP on average) over the 1995-2000 period. Yet, due to 
high real interest payments, the country’s operational deficit was still high (5.8% of 
GNP on average). This contributed to the surge of the debt ratio. 
-  Weak banking sector and “duty losses”: The debt explosion experienced in 2001 was 
the outcome of the hidden Treasury debt, the so called duty losses, coming into the 
open and the rehabilitation costs of the ill-managed private banks that were turned 
over to the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). “Duty losses”, which accumulated 
in public banks, originated from uncompensated credit subsidies and payments for 
agricultural sector and small and medium sized companies. In 2001, the Treasury 
injected close to $40 billion  (around 1/4
th of the GNP of that year) for the 
rehabilitation and restructuring of these state and private banks.  
 
1.3 Primary Surplus-to-GNP Ratio 
The primary surplus-to-GNP ratio realized in 2002 was 3.9%, which fell behind the 6.5% 
target. In terms of actual size, the primary surplus realized at TL9.881 quadrillion levels was 
below the TL16.715 quadrillion target set for the year (The Undersecretariat of Treasury, 
2003b). Even if the primay surplus target had been realized, when divided by the TL273 
quadrillion realized GNP, it would have corresponded to 6.1%, instead of the targeted 6.5% 
  6 primary surplus ratio. The primary surplus level required is calculated by multiplying the 
targeted ratio by the ex-ante estimate of the GNP (or its revised estimate). When the actual 
GNP (ex-post) turns out to be much higher than the revised estimate, the primary surplus ratio 
falls behind the target. Hence, 0.4 [=6.5%(target)-6.1%(realized)] percentage point of the 
shortfall was due to the better than expected growth rate (7.8% instead of 5%) in 2002.  The 
rest of the shortfall in the realization of the primary surplus ratio was due to the weaker than 
expected revenues and expenditure overruns owing to early elections that took place in 
November 2002. Despite the shortfall in the primary surplus ratio, the debt-to-GNP ratio 
declined from 92% in 2001 to 79% in 2002. The favorable effects created on the debt ratio by 
growth and real appreciation of the TL, are the responsible factors behind this drastic fall. 
Hence, in the case of a country where 58% (as of end-2002; 38% originating from the external 
debt, 20% from FX-linked domestic debt) of the public debt stock is FX-linked, the effect of 
exchange rate movements should not be ignored in the debt sustainability discussions. 
 
1.4 Exchange Rate 
Starting May 2003, TL strengthened against foreign exchange. Appreciation was more 
pronounced against the US Dollar (USD) than against Euro due to the change in USD:Euro 
cross rate against the dollar over May and June 2003. TL’s appreciation against the Euro was 
not so drastic in May 2003, however starting in July, TL started gaining further strength 
against both the dollar and Euro, due to increased FX supply, which generally is encountered 
during the summer months due to increased tourism revenues. Merrill Lynch (2003), in its 
June 17, 2003 report, claims that in Turkey “...privatization, EU-inspired reforms, disinflation 
and high [real] interest rates remain supportive of a strong lira.” 
 
  7 Central Bank’s direct interventions to prevent excess volatility as well as currency 
overvaluation were futile in reversing the overvaluation  The Central Bank’s FX buying 
auctions resumed in May 6, 2003 (initially daily ceiling being $20 million, which was raised 
to $30 million in June,  $40 million in early July, $50 million on July 17, 2003 and $75 
million ($25 million of it being option buying) on September 11, 2003). Central Bank’s FX 
buying auctions plus its 5 direct interventions resulted in total dollar purchases equivalent to 
$6 billion by September 10, 2003.  
 
There is a widespread belief that the TL is highly overvalued. If this were true, one would 
expect a significant deterioration in Turkey’s trade balance. However, the export and import 
performance over the first six months of the year when compared to the same period of 2002 
(32% growth in exports (fob) and 34.4% growth in imports (cif, gold included) –Source: 
Central Bank - http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/bop statistics-, does not reveal such an adverse effect 
yet. Over the first six months of 2003, the trade deficit was $5.4 billion and the current 
account deficit was $4 billion (the figures for the same period in 2002 were  $3.15 billion and 
$1.4 billion, respectively). The negative effect on exports created by the real appreciation of 
the TL, might have been partially offset by the improvements in the unit labor costs. A study 
conducted by the State Planning Organisation estimates the productivity growth in the 
manufacturing sector as 18% over the 1999-2002 period; this, along with declining real wages 
in the sector, is claimed to have resulted in reduced unit labor costs. The surge in imports also 
cannot be explained only by the strengthened TL. Only 10% of imports comprise 
consumption goods (January-June, 2003), the rest are investment (15%) and intermediary 
goods (75%). Hence, the strong demand for investment and intermediary good imports may 
be a signal of high growth in 2003, like in 2002 (the 2003 first quarter year-on-year growth 
  8 rate was 7.4% for GNP and 8.1% for GDP. GNP’s 2003 1st six months’ year-on-year growh 
has been 5.4%). 
 
A strong TL, while easing debt sustainability, and creating a favorable impact on the inflation 
rate (pass-through effect of the exchange rate), may also create an adverse effect on the 
current account. In August 2003, the current account deficit target for end-2003 was revised by the 
authorities as $7.4 billion (the original figure was $3.5 billion), in light of the exchange rate 
developments as well as the growth factor. High current account deficit may cause  increased demand 
for foreign currency and hence contribute to correction of the overvaluation of the TL.  
 
1.5 Privatization 
The Government’s 88.9% stake at Petkim, 65.8% stake at Tupras (the oil refinery) and 100% 
stake at TEKEL (the state tobacco and alcohol monopoly) are on the  privatization agenda of 
2003. Tekel alone is expected to generate a significant portion of the privatization revenues 
targeted at around $4 billion. Privatization revenues expected in 2003 are equivalent to 1-2% 
of GNP. 
 
1.6 Inflation Rate 
It is almost certain that the 20% inflation target will be attained by end-2003. This is the 
lowest inflation rate since 1970. 
 
2. Formula Used to Estimate the Primary Surplus Ratio  
The World Bank estimates the primary surplus needed to keep the debt ratio stable using a 
formula that takes growth, real interest rate and seigniorage factors into consideration (World 
Bank, 2000: 16-8, 121-124)
5. At this point, we propose modifying the formula, by adding a 
third term to capture the effect of the exchange rate movements on debt and hence the primary 
  9 surplus requirement. Actually, the exchange rate factor is handled during the process of the 
estimation of real interest rate on FX debt in TL (rfx), which later is plugged into Equation (1).  
The formula used is as follows (all terms are at (t) except the primary surplus ratio (s), which 
is at (t+1)):  
 s(t+1)=  [(rTL - g)/(1 + g )]bTL +[(rFX - g)/(1 + g )]bFX – [(p + g + p x g) / (1 + p + g + p x g)] m    (1)                           
where;  
s = long-term primary surplus-to-GNP ratio that is required for debt sustainability at (t+1)  
bTL = “public sector debt stock denominated in TLs-to-GNP ratio” at the beginning of the period  
bFX = “public sector debt stock denominated in FX-to-GNP ratio” at the beginning of the period 
e    = revaluation rate of FX (FX Basket = 0.5$+0.5Euro) (TL/FX) 
rTL = real interest rate on TL-denominated debt and borrowing 
rFX = real interest rate on FX-linked debt and borrowing in TL terms = {[(1+ifx)(1+e)]/(1+p)}-1 
g   = growth rate 
p   = domestic inflation rate 
m = reserve money-to-GNP ratio, which takes different values under different “real interest rate-
inflation rate” combinations. 
ifx = nominal interest rate on FX-denominated debt in FX. 
(Note: for the derivation of the World Bank (2000) formula on which Equation 1 is based, see Appendix A) 
 
If the primary surplus-to-GNP ratio estimated for 2003 under different scenarios is found to be below 
the targeted 6.5%, the difference between the two figures will contribute to the gradual reduction of 
the government debt stock-to-GNP ratio. 
 
The reserve money-to GNP ratio (m) in equation (1) is estimated using the following regression 
equation
6 (1970-1999): 
ln m = f(r+p) = f(i) where i is the nominal interest. 
 
  10     ln m = -2.2555 – 0.6053 i 
    (-70.100)(-10.790) 
 
   R
2 =0.81; SSR= 0.2946; DW=1.6934 
 
The term, 
    [(p + g + pxg) / (1 + p + g +pxg)] m   
gives the seigniorage amount expressed as percent of GNP. The first two terms of Equation (1), on the 
other hand, give the effect of growth and real interest rate on the primary surplus requirement. This 
part of the equation implies that the closer the real interest rate is to the growth rate, the more 
sustainable is the debt. 
 
3. The Real Interest Rate 
Real interest rate (r) is generated from two sources: FX-linked debt (comprising 58% of 
consolidated budget debt stock as of end-2002) and the TL-denominated debt (comprising 
42% of the consolidated budget debt stock as of end-2002).  
 
The real interest rate on FX-linked debt expressed in TL terms (rFX) can largely be affected by 
real appreciation/depreciation of the TL. Hence, the real interest rate on FX-linked non-
maturing debt plus borrowing in terms of TL, is estimated under scenarios that account for 
exchange rate variability. The procedure used to arrive at the real interest rate on FX-linked 
debt plus borrowing in terms of TL (rFX) is as follows: 
 
First, the interest rate in FX is converted into nominal interest rate in TL using Equation (2). 
iFX* = [(1+iFX)(1+e)]  –1                (2) 
where,  
iFX*= average interest rate on FX-linked debt plus borrowing in TL (nominal) 
iFX = average interest rate on FX-linked debt plus borrowing in FX (nominal) 
  11 e= revaluation rate of FX over the year  
Then, the nominal interest rate in TL terms (iFX*) is converted into real interest rate in TL 
terms (rFX) on FX-linked debt, using Equation (3). 
rFX = [(1+iFX
*)  /  (1+p)]  –1        (3) 
To be able to use realistic figures in our alternative scenarios, we need to have some idea on 
the current average interest rate on FX non-maturing debt plus new borrowing during 
rollover. As a “financing requirement”, the 2003 Program envisages $3,9 billion borrowing 
from  international institutions (theWorld Bank and the IMF) and $6.2 billion external 
borrowing. The interest rate charged by the World Bank is Libor plus 0.75; currently Libor is 
1.34, hence the interest rate on the World Bank credit is around 2.09%. The rate charged by 
the IMF, on the other hand, is around 4-4.5%.  A major portion of the current foreign debt 
stock is the debt to these international institutions, bearing 5-7 year maturities. Hence the 
interest service on this portion of the non-maturing debt over 2003 will also be at levels 
mentioned above. On April 25, 2003, the 10-year Euro bond yield was 11.7%; but it is 
following a declining trend (on March 25, 2003 it was 15%). The $8.5 billion credit offered 
by the USA as Iraq war compensation may carry an interest rate close to the 10-year term US 
Treasury bond rate, which currently is close to 4%. In the average interest rate estimations, 
this is not included. When realized, however, the interest rate on this credit will pull the 
average interest rate further down. In the real interest rate on the FX denominated debt 
estimations below, the average interest rate on the new FX borrowing plus non-maturing FX-
linked debt over 2003, ranges from 9 to 13%, in the different scenarios constructed. Actually, 
these rates are highly cautious since they are much above the average interest rate on the 
current FX-linked debt. 
  12 3.1 Real Interest Rate on FX-Linked Debt in TL Terms 
As mentioned above, using Equation (2), first the FX-denominated interest rate was converted 
into TL-denominated nominal interest rate; and then, using Equation (3) the nominal rate was 
converted into real interest rate on FX-linked debt, in terms of  TL. It is at this stage, when the 
exchange rate factor enters the picture. Table 2 gives the real rates on FX-denominated debt in 
TL, under different scenarios, representing alternative “FX revaluation rate-inflation rate-FX 
interest rate” combinations. For example, in reference to Table 2, if the inflation rate were 
25%, the revaluation rate of FX were 15% and the interest rate of FX debt were 13%, then the 
real interest rate on the non-maturing FX debt plus borrowing would be 4%. 
 
Table 2- Real Interest Rate on FX Debt Expressed in TL Terms 
   Inflation Rate (%) 
   20 25 
   ifx  i fx  
e  0,05 0,07 0,09  0,1 0,11 0,13  0,05  0,07 0,09  0,1 0,11 0,13 
0,15  0,006 0,025 0,045 0,054 0,064 0,083 -0,034 -0,016 0,003 0,012 0,021 0,040 
0,2  0,050 0,070 0,090 0,100 0,110 0,130  0,008  0,027 0,046 0,056 0,066 0,085 
0,25  0,094 0,115 0,135 0,146 0,156 0,177  0,050  0,070 0,090 0,100 0,110 0,130 
0,3  0,138 0,159 0,181 0,192 0,203 0,224  0,092  0,113 0,134 0,144 0,154 0,175 
 
3.2  Average Real Interest Rate on TL-Denominated Debt (new borrowing+non-maturing debt) 
As of end-March 2003 (like in end-2002), 43% of the domestic debt stock was in the form of 
FRNs, paying interest on a quarterly basis. The FRNs sold to the market bear a 2-year term 
and those in the hands of the public institutions bear 3-7 year terms. This means that, if the 
interest rate is following a downward trend, in the following quarters, the interest rate on this 
portion of the debt stock will decline parallel to the interest rate formed at the reference 
auctions. This will automatically bring down the average interest rate on the existing TL-
denominated debt stock. The domestic debt carrying a fixed rate makes up only 25% of the 
total; and the maturity of this debt is relatively short (in the average 9.2 months). The average 
  13 interest rate on the Treasury auctions held over the first 4 months of 2003, was around 53%, 
which implied a real rate above 25%. The Central Bank reduced its overnight lending rate by 
3 percentage points on April 25, 2003, another 3 percentage points on June 4, 2003, and 
another 3 percentage points on August 6,2003 (o/n borrowing/lending rate becoming 32% and 
38%, respectively, as of August 6, 2003). Because of this and the gradually increasing 
confidence, which reduces the risk premium, the interest rates have been following a 
declining trend. The Central Bank is expected to cut its o/n lending rate further when the time 
is right. This move can be expected to lower the Treasury borrowing rates further. Hence a 
real interest rate on the TL-denominated debt/borrowing around 15-20% for 2003 as a whole 
would actually be a highly conservative assumption, considering the fact that the real interest 
rate on the domestic debt stock alone was announced as 11% by the Treasury. 
 
4. Estimation of the Primary Surplus Ratio Required to Keep the Debt Ratio Stable 
Real interest rates on FX-linked debt plus borrowing in TL terms (rFX) given in Table 2 was 
plugged in the second term of Equation (1), along with the growth rate assumption (ranging 
from 3 to 7%) of the different scenarios. The weight (FX-linked debt-to-GNP ratio) (bfx) used 
was 0.4582 [(=0.79 (public debt-to-GNP ratio in 2002) x 0.58 (share of FX-linked debt in 
total public debt)]. The weights used are those of end-2002. The result gave the primary 
surplus requirement originating from FX-linked non-maturing debt plus borrowing.  
 
Similarly, under different “real interest rate (on TL denominated debt)-inflation rate-growth 
rate” scenarios, using the first term of Equation (1), the primary surplus requirement 
originating from TL-denominated debt was estimated. Here the weight (TL-denominated 
debt-to GNP ratio) (bTL) used was 0.3318 [(=0.79 (public debt-to-GNP ratio in 2002) x 0.42 
(share of TL-denominated debt in total public debt)]. Then the primary surplus requirements 
  14 in connection to the FX-linked debt and the TL-denominated debt were summed up. The final 
primary surplus-to-GNP ratio (s) was obtained by adding the seigniorage term’s contribution 
(which has a negative sign in the formula) to this total. The results are reported in Tables 3, 4 
and 5 in Appendix B, which are constructed under the assumptions of 9, 10 and 11% nominal 
FX rate. The estimations in the tables should be interpreted as follows: To keep the public 
debt-to-GNP ratio of end-2002 level, the primary surplus-to-GNP ratio in end-2003 should be 
X% (here, X = the primary surplus-to-GNP ratio (s) mentioned in the table for different 
scenarios). Actually “revenue from privatization-to-GNP” ratio should be deducted from this 
result. In other words, a privatization term should be added to Equation (1) with a negative 
sign.  
 
5. Evaluation of the Results 
At the higher inflation rate (25% instead of 20%), the favorable effect of seigniorage on the 
debt stock ratio is higher. The same is true for the growth rate. Similarly when the revaluation 
rate is below the inflation rate, it implies real appreciation of the TL over the period, leading 
to a lower real interest rate on the FX-linked debt in terms of the TL (holding a nominal 
interest rate on FX debt constant). This too eases debt sustainability. The real interest rate on 
the TL-denominated debt, on the other hand, has an adverse effect on debt sustainability. The 
shaded areas on Tables 3, 4 and 5 given in Appendix B, point to the scenarios where debt 
sustainability becomes questionable, since in these cases the primary surplus requirement is 
above the targeted 6.5%. If we generalize; these specific scenarios implying unsustainability, 
display a high rate of revaluation of FX (25-30%), combined with high a real interest rate on 
the TL-denominated debt (20-25%), which is highly improbable. The situation gets worse as 
the growth rate declines. However, even when the rTL is high, appreciation of the TL and/or a 
high growth rate, may lead to a primary surplus requirement below the 6.5% target. 
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The most likely realizations anticipated for the year 2003 are: 
Inflation Rate (p) = 20;  
Average real interest rate on the TL-denominated debt (rTL) = 15 or 20%; 
Revaluation rate of foreign currency (basket comprising 0.5$+0.5Euro) (e)= 15, 20 or 25%; 
Growth rate (g) = 4, 5 or 6%; 
Average interest rate on FX borrowing and non-maturing debt (iFX)= 9%. 
 
 
Under these circumstances, debt sustainability does not seem to be a problem and in all cases 
public debt ratio is likely to decline since the primary surplus requirement is below the 6.5% 
target level. Now let us estimate the debt-to-GNP ratio in end-2003, under the specific 
scenarios that are most likely to be realized: (all expressed in %; estimations are based on the 
information given in Table 3 in Appendix B) 
g= 5, e=20, p=20, rTL=20, iFX=9; s=4.75, s(target)=6.5; b(2003)=79-(6.5-4.75)=77.25 
g= 5, e=20, p=25, rTL=20, iFX=9; s=2.66, s(target)=6.5; b(2003)=79-(6.5-2.66)=75.16 
g= 5, e=15, p=20, rTL=20, iFX=9; s=2.85, s(target)=6.5; b(2003)=79-(6.5-2.85)=75.35 
g= 5, e=20, p=25, rTL=15, iFX=9; s=1.01, s(target)=6.5; b(2003)=79-(6.5-1.01)=73.5 
g= 6, e=15, p=20, rTL=20, iFX=9; s=1.93, s(target)=6.5; b(2003)=79-(6.5-1.93)=74.43 
g= 6, e=20, p=25, rTL=15, iFX=9; s=0.21, s(target)=6.5; b(2003)=79-(6.5-0.21)=72.71 
 
(Note: By September 2003, it was almost certain that the 20% inflation target would be 
realized. However, to show the effect of inflation on primary surplus requirement, 25% 
inflation is also included in estimations for exercise purposes.) 
 
The results indicate that small changes in the assumptions for variables such as growth, the 
real TL interest rate, the revaluation/devaluation rate and the inflation rate, yield widely 
different primary surplus requirements for the debt to be sustainable. However, under fairly 
conservative, but realistic assumptions about the variables mentioned above, the model used 
points to a relatively stable debt-to-GNP ratio, displaying a downward trend. The fall in the  
real TL interest rate and the real exchange rate remaining strong, can improve the debt profile 
even behind expectations.  
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6. A Graphical Presentation of the Revaluation Rate-Real TL Interest Rate 
Combinations that Render Debt Sustainable 
To find the revaluation rate-real TL interest rate combinations that render the debt 
sustainable under different FX interest rate-growth rate-inflation rate scenarios, Equation (1) 
was transformed as follows: 
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As a result of the transformation of Equation (1), a term denoted by the letter “a” is derived, 
which encompasses all the ingredients of Equation (1), with the exception of ‘e’ and ‘rTL’.  ‘e’ 
and ‘rTL’ represent the X and Y-axis, respectively, in the charts below (iFX and m taken as 
given and stable). 
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The Y intercept will be a/bTL  and the X intercept will be a/bFX; the slope of the line denoting 
bFX/bTL. The locus of e and rTL combinations in line with the target s=6.5%, make up the 
boundary drawn.  
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The following conclusions can be drawn from the charts: 
a. If the economy grows faster, ceteris paribus, an outward shift of the boundary is relevant. 
b. If inflation rate surges, ceteris paribus, an outward shift of the boundary is relevant. In such 
a case, higher seigniorage gains will enable policy makers to maintain the stable debt ratio 
even at higher rTL and e combinations 
c. Ceteris paribus, if s<6.5%, an inward shift of the boundary will take place. In such a case, 
only lower rTL and/or e can keep the debt ratio stable. 
 
Chart 1 - Revaluation Rate of FX, Real TL Interest Rate and Debt Sustainability


























  18 Chart 2 - Revaluation Rate of FX, Real TL Interest Rate and Debt Sustainability

























7. In Turkey, can the Debt Ratio Ever Satisfy the Maastricht Criteria? 
Strictly interpreted, the Maastricht criteria require that the public debt stock-GDP ratio be 
60%. Will Turkey ever be able to achieve this? In order to extend the analysis presented 
earlier, to forecast the relevant ratios over the 2004-2005 period, it is necessary to make 
certain assumptions.  
 
The inflation target for 2004 is 12%. The primary surplus ratio targeted remains at 6.5% and 
the FX borrowing rate remains at 9% during 2004. The composition of public debt stock with 
respect to its FX and TL-denominated parts is assumed to remain the same (58% and 42%, 
respectively); “m” equals 4%. The end-2003 debt ratio estimated earlier was somewhere 
between 72 and 75%. Acting conservatively, the starting point for the 2004 projections is 
accepted as 75% (debt ratio of end-2003). Under alternative scenarios, the debt ratio at end-
2004 can take values ranging between 70-73% (privatization revenues excluded).  An 
estimation of the debt ratio for end-2004 and 2005, under selected scenarios is given below: 
 
  19 Debt Ratio at End- 2004 Under Selected Scenarios: 
g= 4, e=10, p=12, rTL=15, iFX=9; s=4.75, s(target)=6.5; b(2004)=75-(6.5-4.04)=72.5 
g= 5, e=10, p=12, rTL=15, iFX=9; s=2.66, s(target)=6.5; b(2004)=75-(6.5-3.25)=71.8 
g= 6, e=10, p=12, rTL=15, iFX=9; s=2.85, s(target)=6.5; b(2004)=75-(6.5-2.48)=71.0 
g= 4, e=12, p=10, rTL=10, iFX=9; s=1.01, s(target)=6.5; b(2004)=75-(6.5-2.30)=72.7 
g= 5, e=12, p=10, rTL=10, iFX=9; s=1.93, s(target)=6.5; b(2004)=75-(6.5-3.10)=71.9 
g= 6, e=12, p=10, rTL=10, iFX=9; s=0.21, s(target)=6.5; b(2004)=75-(6.5-3.80)=71.2 
 
To forecast the end-2005 debt ratio, we assume the starting point debt-ratio (that of end-2004) 
to be 71% (privatization revenues excluded). The inflation rate for 2005 is assumed to be 8% 
or 7%, in the different scenarios adopted. The primary surplus ratio targeted remains at 6.5% 
and the FX borrowing rate remains at 9% during 2005. The composition of public debt stock 
with respect to its FX and TL denominated parts is assumed to remain the same (58% and 
42%, respectively). “m” is 4% in all cases. An estimation of debt ratio for end-2004, under 
selected scenarios is given below (privatization revenues not considered): 
 
Debt Ratio at End-2005 Under Selected Scenarios (all in %): 
g= 4, e=8, p=8, rTL=15, iFX=9; s=3.21, s(target)=6.5; b(2004)=71-(6.5-3.21)=67.7 
g= 5, e=8, p=8, rTL=15, iFX=9; s=2.46, s(target)=6.5; b(2004)=71-(6.5-2.46)=67.0 
g= 6, e=8, p=8, rTL=15, iFX=9; s=1.73, s(target)=6.5; b(2004)=71-(6.5-1.73)=66.2 
g= 4, e=7, p=7, rTL=10, iFX=9; s=2.72, s(target)=6.5; b(2004)=71-(6.5-2.72)=67.2 
g= 5, e=7, p=7, rTL=10, iFX=9; s=1.98, s(target)=6.5; b(2004)=71-(6.5-1.98)=66.5 
g= 6, e=7, p=7, rTL=10, iFX=9; s=1.26, s(target)=6.5; b(2004)=71-(6.5-1.26)=65.8 
 
The debt ratio is expected to fall to a level somewhere between 66-68% by end-2005. If 
privatization revenue-to-GNP ratio is deducted from the final figures obtained, the ratio may 
go down further by an additional 1 or 2 percentage points in all end-2003, end-2004 as well as 
end-2005 (Chart 3). 
 















As the estimation results indicate, the debt ratio is likely to follow a declining trend, 
ultimately reaching the 60% level in the years to follow. Since the estimations above are 
based on conservative assumptions, the 60% level may be reached sooner than expected. It 
may be worth noting that, as the inflation rate ebbs, the contribution of the seigniorage factor 
to easing the debt ratio gets smaller.  
 
8. Conclusion 
In Turkey, the Strengthened Stabilization Program (The Undersecretariat of Treasury, 2001), 
adopted in May 2001, covering the period between 2001-2004, which is technically and 
financially supported by the IMF and the World Bank, started to give its fruits. The stability is 
gradually being achieved; along with it confidence is being restored and spreads are declining. 
Growth and inflation prospects are favorable and the PSBR is on the decline. Trade balance, 
however may close the year 2003 with an enlarged deficit due to the appreciation of the TL 
and better than expected growth. In the aftermath of the Iraq war, Tourism revenues were also 
adversely affected. 
 
  21 As the risky country image is being transformed into a low-risk country image, the real 
interest rates on the TL-denominated borrowing as well as spreads on foreign borrowing are 
expected to fall and foreign direct investment is expected to increase. The TL is claimed to be 
over-valued both in 2002 and 2003. Despite this development, however, Turkey’s exports 
have been on the rise. We believe that the TL is not as over-valued as suggested by the Real 
Effective Exchange Rate Index published regularly by the Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey (CBRT). The index mentioned uses 1995 as the base year, which we believe is a poor 
choice, considering the BOP performance in that year. As a result, the index indicates an 
exaggerated appreciation of the Turkish Lira.  
 
The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) resumed its FX buying auctions on May 
6, 2003, its primary aim being enhancing its FX reserves. Daily limit on the purchases was set 
as $20 million, which was raised gradually to $75 million ($25 million of it being option 
buying) between May and September 2003. However from time to time in the event of excess 
volatility in both directions, CBRT directly intervenes in FX market. Between May 6-
September 10, 2003, CBRT purchased $6 billion through daily FX buying auctions and five 
direct interventions conducted. The Central Bank’s purchase of FX was expected to slow 
down TL’s appreciation, while enhancing the official reserves. However it did not exert the 
anticipated effect on the exchange rate. The appreciation of the TL may be cut back as a result 
of the increased demand for FX resulting from enlarged current account deficit in 2003. If the 
TL continues to appreciate, Central Bank may consider additional corrective actions such as 
deeper rate cuts. TL’s appreciation is the outcome of mainly the reversal in currency 
substitution; but it is also affected by high real interest rates on the TL-denominated assets, as 
well as prospective 2003 privatizations (such as Petkim, the petro-chemical plant; Tupras, the 
oil refinery; and Tekel, the tobacco and alcohol monopoly). The excessive volatility in the 
  22 exchange rates seen especially since the end of April 2003 was also the result of excessive FX 
selling because of the need for TL liquidity for tax payments. The CBRT continues its TL 
deposit buying auctions with a standard of 4-week maturity, which was initiated in April 
2002. The aim of this tool is to enhance the effectiveness of efforts to sterilize excess TL 
liquidity in the system. The maximum amount at each auction is limited to TL200 trillion. 
Hence while the TL injection results as CBRT purchases FX, the TL deposit buying auctions 
may sterilize part of this TL expansion. In the years ahead, under the floating rate regime, the 
exchange rate may be expected to move parallel to the purchasing power parity, displaying 
much less volatility. 
 
As the results of our analysis indicate, for Turkey the default risk is very low and there is no 
need for restructuring of the debt. Turkey is frequently being mentioned in the same pot with 
Argentina and Brazil and similar default risk is being implied for all three countries  (e.g. 
Goldstein, 2003). We believe that a high-growth country under a floating rate regime, with no 
significant depreciation prospect, which has a good export performance and strong reserves 
(CBRT’s gross FX reserves were $29.8 billion as of September 5, 2003), where the PSBR is 
declining, the banking sector is strengthened (CARs being much above legal requirements, 
and short positions being at zero or insignificant levels), should not be judged in the same 
category with Argentina and Brazil. In the medium run, Turkey’s debt ratio is expected to 
follow a declining trend, reaching the 60% level (the Maastricht criteria) within a few years.  
 
In sum, for Turkey debt sustainability is likely to be much less of a problem in the years 
ahead. Low spreads, low risk premiums and hence low real interest rates along with longer 
maturity, will make debt rollover much easier. Actually in Turkey, the debt-to-GNP ratio is 
not so high when compared to such countries like Belgium, Italy, Greece and Japan, just to 
  23 name a few. But in those countries maturity is much longer and real interest rates are very 
low. The problem with Turkey’s debt stock is its short maturity
7 and high real interest rates, 
which will be resolved as stability is gained and confidence is restored. Lasting stability can 
be achieved only if the present stabilization program is strictly enforced. 
. 
Notes 
*The author is affiliated with METU, Department of Economics. She is most grateful to Prof. Oktar Türel for his 
constructive suggestions in connection to the graphical representation of the results. Sincere thanks are also due 
to Prof. Craig Burnside for his further elaboration of the primary surplus equation derivation given in World 
Bank (2000).   
1For some of the literature, which analyzes external debt sustainability issue using the “present value constraint” 
approach, see World Bank and IMF (2000), Lachler (2001), Edwards (2002). In Edwards’ work (2002), the role 
of debt relief in debt sustainability analysis is emphasized in reference to Nicaragua, as a representative of the 
HIPC.  
2On sustainability analyses see, for example, Edwards (2002), Milesi-Ferreti, Maria and Razin (2000), Uctum 
and Wickens (2000).  
3This part of the debt stock indicates direct indebtedness of the Treasury. SEE’s and Central Bank’s debts are 
excluded. As of end-2002, the Central Bank was not in a net-debtor position; and if SEEs are assumed to be able 
to pay their debts out of their earnings, the central government net debt stock is the part of the total debt stock 
that should be considered in connection to the debt sustainability issue. 
4 In the $13.9 billion debt to IMF, IMF credit extended to CBRT is not included. The Central Bank gave $5.9 
billion of the IMF credit it received to the Treasury to be used for budget financing. The Treasury gave the 
CBRT Treasury paper in return. Hence the $5.9 billion is seen as part of the $91.7 billion domestic debt stock. 
5 We added pxg to both the numerator and the denominator of the seigniorage term (see Appendix A for 
derivation of the formula). Goldfajn (2002) and Goldstein (2003), in their primary surplus estimations, ignore the 
seigniorage factor and use a formula that accounts for real interest rate and the growth factor only. 
6To be able to apply this formula, it was necessary that real income (y) elasticity of real reserve money (rrm) 
(deflated by WPI) be close to unity. The OLS estimation result given below satisfies this condition. The reason 
  24 why annual data over the period 1970-1999 was used is because the crises years (2000 and 2001) could not be 
accepted as normal years. 
    ln rrm = -2.1268 + 0.967 ln y – 0.0057 R  (R is the nominal interest rate on time deposits) 
      (-3.7513) (6.3432)      (-3.5370) 
    R-Bar-Squared =0.76;  SSR= 0.0.2975 ; DW-statistics=1.676  
 
7 Average maturity of total domestic debt stock  was 27.1 months (12.9 months on cash sales, 56.2 months on 
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Appendix A 
The government budget constraint can be expressed as follows: 
Bt – Bt-1 = It – St – (Mt – Mt-1)           (0.1) 
 
Where subscript t stands for time, measured in years, Bt is the amount of public debt at the 
end of period t, It is interest payments, St is the primary surplus (revenue minus noninterest 
expenditure), and Mt is the base money and the end of period t, all measured in local currency 
units. If we assume that time is discrete, that all debt has a maturity of one period, and that 
debt is nominal and pays a constant nominat interest, R, then Equation 0.1 can be rewritten as  
 
Bt = (1+ R)Bt-1  – St – (Mt – Mt-1)       (0.2) 
Dividing Equation 0.2 by GNP, (Ptyt), we get    



















R b     (0.3) 
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Table 3 - Primary Surplus Ratio Required (%)  iFX = 9%   
   Inflation Rate (%) 
   20 25 
   rTL (%)  rTL (%) 
   e(%)  15 20 25  15  20  25 
15  2,86 4,51 6,18  0,84  2,51  4,16 
20  4,96  6,61  8,28  2,74 4,41 6,06 






30  8,96  10,61  12,28  6,64  8,31  9,96 
15  2,04 3,68 5,33  0,02  1,68  3,31 






25  6,04  7,68  9,33  3,82 5,48 7,11 
 
 
30  8,04  9,68  11,33  5,72  7,38  9,01 
15  1,23 2,85 4,49  -0,89  0,76  2,38 
20  3,13 4,75 6,39  1,01  2,66  4,28 






30  7,13  8,75  10,39  4,81 6,46 8,08 
15  0,32 1,93 3,56  -1,69 -0,06  1,55 
20  2,32 3,93 5,56  0,21  1,84  3,45 






30  6,22  7,89  9,46  4,01 5,64 7,25 
15  -0,48 1,12 2,73  -2,49 -0,86  0,73 
20  1,52 3,12 4,73  -0,59  1,04  2,63 






30  5,32  6,92  8,53  3,11 4,74 6,33 
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Table 4 - Primary Surplus Ratio Required (%)  iFX = 10% 
   Inflation Rate (%) 
   20 25 
   rTL (%)  rTL (%) 
   e(%)  15 20 25  15  20  25 
15  3,36 5,01 6,68  1,24 2,91 4,56 
20  5,36  7,01  8,68  3,24 4,91 6,56 






30  9,46  11,11  12,78  7,14  8,81  10,46 
15  2,44 4,08 5,73  0,42  2,08  3,71 
20  4,44 6,08 7,73  2,32 3,98 5,61 






30  8,54  10,18  11,83  6,22  7,88  9,51 
15  1,63 3,25 4,89  -0,49  1,16  2,78 
20  3,63 5,25 6,89  1,51 3,16 4,78 






30  7,63  9,25  10,89  5,31  6,96  8,58 
15  0,72 2,33 3,96  -1,294 0,344  1,95 
20  2,72 4,33 5,96  0,61  2,24  3,85 






30  6,72  8,33  9,96  4,41 6  7,65 
15  -0,08 1,52 3,13  -2,09 -0,47  1,13 
20  1,92 3,52 5,13  -0,19  1,44  3,03 






30  5,82  7,42  9,03  3,61 5,24 6,83 
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Table 5 - Primary Surplus Ratio Required (%)  iFX = 11% 
   Inflation Rate (%) 
   20 25 
   rTL (%)  rTL (%) 
   e(%)  15 20 25  15  20  25 
15  3,76 5,41 7,08  1,64 3,31 4,96 
20  5,86  7,51  9,18  3,64 5,31 6,96 






30  9,96  11,61  13,28  7,54  9,21  10,86 
15  2,84 4,48 6,13  0,82  2,48  4,11 
20  4,94 6,58 8,23  2,72 4,38 6,01 






30  9,04  10,68  12,33  6,62  8,28  9,91 
15  2,03 3,65 5,29  -0,09  1,56  3,18 
20  4,03 5,65 7,29  1,91 3,56 5,18 






30  8,03  9,65  11,29  5,93  7,36  8,98 
15  1,22 2,83 4,46  -0,89  0,74  2,35 
20  3,22 4,83 6,46  1,01  2,64  4,25 






30  7,12  8,73  10,36  4,91  6,54  8,15 
15  0,32 1,92 3,53  -1,7 -0,06  1,53 
20  2,32 3,92 5,53  0,21  1,83  3,4 












Kamu Borç Stokunun Sürdürülebilirliği ve Kur: Türkiye Örneği 
 
Yazıda, Net Konsolide Kamu Borç Stoku’nun sürdürülebilirliği tartışması, operasyonal açık, 
senyoraj faktörü ve büyümenin yanısıra, kur faktörünü de içerecek biçimde ele alınmıştır. 
Kullanılan model, Dünya Bankası (2000:16-18; 121-124) tarafından geliştirilen formüle 
dayanmaktadır. Analiz iki etapta yapılmaktadır. Önce reel faiz oranı hesaplanmakta, daha 
sonra hesaplanan bu oranlar ana formüle yerleştirilmektedir. Kur faktörü, döviz ile ilintili borç 
stokunun TL cinsi reel faizini hesaplama aşamasında ele alınmaktadır. Farklı enflasyon oranı-
kur değişimi-büyüme-faiz oranı bileşimlerinden oluşan senaryolar için borcun 
sürdürülebilmesi için gereken faiz dışı fazla oranı hesaplanmakta ve elde edilen bu oranlar 
hedeflenen faiz dışı oranla karşılaştırılarak “sürdürülebilirlik” konusunda yorum 
yapılmaktadır.  